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After years of apparent success, inﬂation targeting (IT) has recently come under ﬁre for its in-
ability to prevent (or even its contribution to) the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09. The recent
debate has largely centered on whether inﬂation targeting prevented central banks from respond-
ing sufﬁciently to asset price bubbles.1
But IT has always had its skeptics, even before the latest wave of scrutiny. One longstanding
question is whether the policy framework could actually matter for outcomes as much as, and
in the way that, its advocates said it should. IT proponents, such as Bernanke et al. (1999) and
Svensson (1997, 1999a), portrayed it as a ﬂexible monetary framework that would allow central
banks to pursue countercyclical monetary policy while maintaining medium- and long-run price
stability. (The phrase “disciplined discretion” has sometimes been used to convey this idea.)
Critics found this claim too good to be true. Neumann & von Hagen (2002), Friedman (2003),
and Ball & Sheridan (2004) expressed doubts that merely declaring a numerical inﬂation target,
while reserving the right to respond to shocks, would offer any tangible advantage over conven-
tional discretionary frameworks. The second question is whether IT’s touted advantages would
come at the cost of greater output instability, due to a stricter adherence to a rigid policy rule.
This concern has often been expressed by Federal Reserve policymakers, such as Kohn (2003)
and Meyer (2004), and by some academics, notably Friedman & Kuttner (1996) and Friedman
(2004). The essential issue, in other words, was that of credibility versus ﬂexibility: how IT could
be constraining enough to have an effect, and yet ﬂexible enough to allow for meaningful output
stabilization.
The challenge facing IT proponents was to resolve this paradox — to explain how central banks
could have their cake and eat it too. King (1997) and Kuttner & Posen (1999) argued informally
that ﬂexible inﬂation targeting allowed central banks to anchor expectations while approximat-
ing the optimal state contingent rule. Theoretical rationales for this view include Walsh’s (1995,
2003) contracting interpretation of IT, and models, such as that of Faust & Svensson (2001), in
which the transparency associated with IT mitigated the problem of private information. Empiri-
1Contributions to this debate include Walsh (2009), Nelson (2009), Giavazzi & Giovannini (2010), Clarida (2010),
Dale et al. (2010), McCallum (2010), Orphanides (2010), Svensson (2010b), Mishkin (2011), and Issing (2011).
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the level and persistence of inﬂation in countries that adopted IT. However these studies found
little difference between implicit (e.g., U.S.) and explicit (e.g., U.K.) inﬂation targeters. Conse-
quently, much of the extant evidence fails to address the argument put forth in Friedman (2003)
and Ball & Sheridan (2004) that most central banks, not just inﬂation targeters, enjoyed better
outcomes in recent years. One reason for this is that the widespread adoption of IT happened to
coincide with a period of historically low inﬂation and output volatility (the “great moderation”)
and mild macroeconomic shocks. As Kuttner (2004) noted, IT had not yet been tested by a situa-
tion involving meaningful tradeoffs between low inﬂation and stable output.
This paper is an effort to assess IT’s ﬂexibility, and to evaluate the critique that the policy is ex-
cessively constraining during periods of large economic shocks. Section 2 reviews the theoretical
literature bearing on the ﬂexibility-credibility issue as it applies to inﬂation targeting. Of particu-
lar interest are the conditions under which a relaxation or outright suspension of the inﬂation tar-
get might be warranted, and the question of whether such an action would undermine conﬁdence
in the target. Section 3 proposes a novel gauge of ﬂexibility: the speed with which medium-term
inﬂation expectations, measured by professional forecasts, converge to the target following a dis-
turbance. The analysis entails a comparison between the U.K., which has an explicit inﬂation tar-
get, and the U.S., which does not. The past few years’ experience are especially relevant on this
dimension, as many countries, including the U.S. and the U.K., have experienced much larger
inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations than over the preceding two decades.
The main empirical ﬁndings are twofold. The ﬁrst is that in both countries, long-run inﬂation
expectations, measured by the spreads between nominal and indexed bonds, are largely unrespon-
sive to economic news, suggesting that inﬂation expectations have remained anchored in spite of
the recent inﬂation volatility. The second and more novel ﬁnding is that there is no discernible
difference across countries in the perceived speed of inﬂation adjustment. This result holds for
positive as well as negative deviations from the inﬂation target, and for large as well as small de-
viations. If anything, the Bank of England may be slightly more ﬂexible (in the sense of allow-
ing more gradual adjustment) than the Federal Reserve. Taken together, the results indicate that
whatever inﬂation stability IT has been able to confer on U.K. monetary policy, it has not come at
the expense of diminished ﬂexibility.
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Having grown out of practical imperatives rather than a fully-articulated model, mapping inﬂa-
tion targeting into a consistent theoretical framework presents a challenge. Theoretical analy-
ses of IT typically draw on the well-known Barro & Gordon (1983) model and its descendants.
While at best a crude characterization of the policymaking environment, it is nonetheless useful
for illustrating the tension between ﬂexibility and credibility.
The model is so familiar that the briefest of summaries will sufﬁce. The conventional if unrealis-
tic assumption is that the central bank directly controls inﬂation, and output is then determined by
a Lucas aggregate supply (AS) curve,
y = y+b(p  pe)+e ; (1)
where y is equilibrium output and e is a supply (output) shock. The second key assumption is
that the central bank minimizes an objective function of the form
Lcb = (p  p)2+l(y k)2 : (2)
where k represents the central bank’s desired output gap, and p is the inﬂation target. Minimiz-
ing this loss function taking pe as given (i.e., under discretion) yields the following targeting rule
(TR),
p = p+lb(k y) : (3)
Two implications follow. One is the classic inﬂation bias result: if k > y, then in equilibrium
inﬂation will exceed the central bank’s target, while output will remain at y. The second is that
the optimal central bank response will be partially to offset adverse output shocks by choosing a
higher inﬂation rate.
The model’s solution is readily depicted in (y;p) space as the intersection of the AS and TR
curves, equations 1 and 3. This is shown in ﬁgure 1a, assuming for simplicity that p = y = 0.
If expected inﬂation were zero, the equilibrium would occur at point A. Recognizing the central
bank’s incentives, however, the public will correctly anticipate the central bank’s policy and set
pe = lbk. In the absence of any shock, equilibrium would occur at point B, at the intersection of
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tive shocks shifting the curve to the left. The degree of accommodation will depend on the slope
of the TR curve, lb.
Given that inﬂation in excess of the target is costly, in the absence of shocks the discretionary
outcome is plainly suboptimal. It would therefore be desirable (assuming it were feasible) to
“precommit” to a zero-inﬂation policy, in which case the TR curve in ﬁgure 1a would be replaced
by a horizontal line at p = 0. Such a policy would prevent the central bank from responding ap-
propriately to economic shocks, however. In the Barro-Gordon framework, the ﬂexibility-versus-
credibility tension manifests itself as a choice between a rigid zero-inﬂation rule and a fully dis-
cretionary policy. A central bank minimizing ex ante expected loss would choose the rule if the
variance of the output shocks were below a certain threshold, and discretion if the shocks’ vari-
ance exceeded that threshold.
Rogoff’s (1985) twist on the Barro-Gordon framework was to appoint a “conservative” central
banker whose weight on output, l, was less than that of society. This corresponds to a shallower
TR curve, as depicted in ﬁgure 1b. Inﬂation is lower than it would otherwise have been (the TR
line intersects the vertical axis at a lower level), but output shocks will not be offset as much as
they would have been under discretion. There is again a tradeoff between credibility (interpreted
as conservatism), which reduces the inﬂation bias; and ﬂexibility, which allows for an appropri-
ately accommodative response to shocks.
Neither the Barro-Gordon nor the Rogoff model allows the central bank’s policy response to de-
pend on the magnitude of the shocks. Flood and Isard’s (1989) insight was that the cost in terms
of suboptimal inﬂation stabilization of strict adherence to a rule is proportional to the square of
the shock size. Consequently, there are gains from conditioning the policy response on the size of
the shock, with more accommodation of larger shocks. Allowing the policymaker to switch from
an inﬂation-only rule to full discretion for large shock realizations would give rise to a TR curve
like that depicted in ﬁgure 2.2 In this case, the central bank would obey a strict zero-inﬂation rule
under normal circumstances, when inﬂation bias made the larger contribution to the loss function,
2This is only a rough caricature of the full Flood-Isard model, which considers mixed strategies, and the choice be-
tween full discretion and a commitment to a partially state-contingent base growth rule.
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This insight would naturally generalize to the decision to deviate from a Rogoff-style conserva-
tive (small l) policy in favor of one of full accommodation.
The most straightforward interpretation of IT in the context of this class of models is as “inﬂation
only” targeting. While simplistic, it is easily motivated by the Barro & Gordon (1983) model, as
it corresponds to the “precommitment” case. This interpretation of IT as inﬂation-only targeting
has been strenuously contested by King (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999), among many others.
Svensson (2010a) in particular has insisted that ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is fundamentally a tar-
geting rule, like equation (1) above, expressing the optimal tradeoff between output and inﬂation
ﬂuctuations:4
“Therefore, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting can be described as “forecast targeting”: “the
central bank chooses a policy-rate path so that the forecast of inﬂation and resource
utilization stabilizes both inﬂation around the inﬂation target and resource utilization
around a normal level or achieves a reasonable compromise between the two.”
Svensson’s interpretation raises three important questions, however. One is what distinguishes
IT from the conventional theory, laid out in Tinbergen (1952), of optimal policy in a situation
with more targets than instruments. As Benjamin Friedman once observed when discussing a
conference paper on IT:
“[D]epiction of inﬂation targeting as maximizing a utility function including both an
inﬂation term AND a term in the output gap...That’s what people like me had been
doing for decades...the idea that inﬂation targeting was how one maximized an ob-
jective function in output and inﬂation is what led me to suggest that, like Moli` ere’s
Monsieur Jordaine, I must have been talking inﬂation targeting all along without re-
alizing it.”5
3Lohmann (1992) showed how such a policy framework could result from a game between the government and the
central bank, in which the central bank resorts to the ﬂexible policy under the threat of a political override.
4Pace Svensson, IT is often modeled as a Taylor-style instrument rule: see, for example, Gal´ ı (2002) and McCallum
(2002).
5Email communication with Benjamin M. Friedman, April 5, 2011. The reference is to the central character in
Moli` ere’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (1670), Act II, sc. iv, stating “Par ma foi, il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis
de la prose, sans que j’en susse rien.” (“Good heavens! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without
knowing it.”)
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for inﬂation obliges central banks to achieve that target at all costs, even when doing so would
compromise the output stabilization objective.6 The objection applies with particular force to a
situation in which a large adverse shock threatened to breach the inﬂation target. Concern with
overshooting the target would then require the central bank to behave more conservatively (de-
picted as a ﬂattening of the TR curve) in the face of large shocks: in ﬁgure 3, the economy would
move to point C rather than the optimal point B. The central bank becomes a prisoner of its own
anti-inﬂationary rhetoric.
Faust & Henderson (2004) presented a fully worked-out version of Friedman’s (2004) critique.
They observed that optimal policy involves a commitment to return inﬂation to the target grad-
ually and asymptotically, and not necessarily at some ﬁxed horizon. When shocks are small, the
two- to three-year horizon typically speciﬁed by inﬂation-targeting central banks is sufﬁcient to
bring inﬂation reasonably close to the target. A longer horizon would be appropriate for large
shocks, however, and hitting the target over an abbreviated period of time may be insufﬁciently
accommodative.
One rejoinder to this critique is that inﬂation targeting frameworks typically include an “escape
clause,” which allows the central bank to defer the attainment of the target in order to respond to
large economic shocks with an appropriate degree of accommodation. The rationale for such a
policy follows naturally from the Flood & Isard (1989) and Lohmann (1992) analyses.
A third issue is exactly how merely specifying a targeting rule anchors expectations and prevents
central banks from opportunistically pursuing a discretionary policy — a question that is espe-
cially pertinent when central banks have the option to exercise an escape clause. Presumably,
the release of information by the inﬂation targeting central bank is the basis for anchoring ex-
pectations, and thus any additional ﬂexibility, rather than anything distinctive about the inﬂation
targeting central bank’s policy approach to stabilization in and of itself.
The information provided by inﬂation targeting takes two forms. One is the public announce-
ment of a numerical target. The second consists of detailed communication about the state of the
6Friedman (2003) also pointed out that stabilizing output while talking only about the inﬂation objective would be
inconsistent with targeters’ professed emphasis on transparency.
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into play by removing (or at least reducing) uncertainty about the level of inﬂation around which
the central bank is stabilizing price movements. This should enable the public and markets to
hold the central bank accountable for whether the central bank is living up to its commitment.
In Walsh’s (1995, 2003) view, a speciﬁc target allows for the implementation of a contract that
aligns the central banker’s incentives with those of the public. An alternative interpretation, dis-
cussed below, is that the target, and the procedures associated with missing the target (e.g., writ-
ing letters to elected ofﬁcials) provide an opportunity to communicate to the public the special
circumstances that might require the temporary relaxation of the target. The purpose of detailed
communication is clearly to share with the public the central bank’s assessment of the shocks
facing the economy, and to dispel the perception that the central bank might be concealing infor-
mation about the nature of those shocks.
Understanding exactly how these mechanisms work requires appealing to a more complex set of
theoretical models which, while related to the Barro & Gordon (1983) framework, include two
additional features. Following Backus & Drifﬁll (1985), one is that central bankers differ either
according to their desired output level (k in the context of the model sketched above), or their de-
gree of conservatism (the l parameter in the same model). This is a plausible assumption, given
that Kuttner & Posen (2010) found a tendency for unanticipated central bank governor turnover
to generate signiﬁcant ﬁnancial market reactions.8
The second feature is that unobserved shocks prevent the private sector from distinguishing ﬂuc-
tuations in output and/or inﬂation that are caused by macroeconomic disturbances from those
caused by the central bank deviating from its stated rule. This can be modeled as in Faust &
Svensson (2001) by assuming that rather than having perfect control over inﬂation, the central
banker sets an “intended” inﬂation rate, and the actual rate is the intended rate plus some shock,
h. This is in turn the sum of two shocks, the observable x and the unobservable n.
The inference problem can be illustrated schematically using the AS and TR curves as in ﬁgure
4a. Suppose the economy starts at point A, and experiences an adverse output shock that shifts
7Bernanke et al. (1999), Posen (2002), Kuttner (2004) and Svensson (2010a) discussed the operational aspects of
transparency under inﬂation targeting.
8The evidence presented in the paper suggests that differences in l may be more relevant than differences in k.
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One is that the central bank acts like a dove, and follows a rule with k > 0, as in the dashed line.
Alternatively, the central bank can claim that it was shooting for the “intended” inﬂation rate
(which would have put the economy at point B), but because of a positive n realization, inﬂation
turned out to be higher than planned. Similar logic applies to the case of an unknown l, shown in
ﬁgure 4b: with a high-l central bank, an adverse supply shock would move the economy to point
C; but this is observationally equivalent to the response of a low-l central bank, an “intended”
inﬂation rate consistent with point B, and the realization of a positive n shock. Essentially, the
presence of the unobserved control error n allows the central bank to behave less conservatively
and get away with it.
With no way to distinguish between observationally equivalent outcomes, the public will resort
to signal extraction to assess the plausibility of the central banks’ excuse taking into account the
relevant relative variances. If the variance of n is small (i.e., there is greater transparency of in-
tentions), then the central bank will not be able to get away with its ruse. More speciﬁcally, it will
have the incentive to “behave itself” to reduce the degree to which higher-than-expected inﬂation
causes people to revise (upward) their estimate of the unobserved k.9
In the Faust-Svensson framework, a more transparent central bank is one in which the variance of
n is small relative to the variance of x. The disclosure of information by inﬂation-targeting cen-
tral banks presumably reduces the noise-to-signal ratio, thus enforcing more responsible behav-
ior. Therefore, to the extent that it promotes transparency, inﬂation targeting strengthens central
banks’ incentive to build a reputation for low inﬂation by refraining from opportunistic behavior.
In some sense, this is the inverse of the Cukierman & Meltzer (1986) result that ambiguity allows
central banks to pursue a discretionary policy.
We conjecture that analogous logic would apply to a model with measurement error in the output
gap, i.e. y = ˆ y+z, where ˆ y is the true output gap and z is measurement error, and unobserved
central bank preferences.10 This would also create an inference problem: the equilibrium at point
9In the Faust-Svensson model, it turns out that simply revealing k is the worst of all possible worlds, as that would
remove the incentive for the central bank to preserve its reputation.
10Kuttner (1994) proposed a method for quantifying this error, and Orphanides (2001) attributed much of the inﬂa-
tion of the 1970s to inaccurate estimates of the output gap.
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tral banker, and no measurement error; or the result of a large shock (a shift to AS00), a conser-
vative central banker, and a positive realization of the output gap measurement error, z. As in
Faust & Svensson (2001) and Cukierman & Meltzer (1986), the private sector has to make infer-
ences about the output shock and the central bank’s preferences based on what it knows about the
relative variances of the unobservables. Once again, this gives the central banker an incentive to
maintain a reputation for low inﬂation.
A property common to all models of this type is that the shocks’ relative variances — the signal-
to-noise ratio — determine the optimal policy. In the pre-crisis “great moderation” world with
small output shocks, the measurement error associated with the output gap would loom large.
The inference problem would be nontrivial in this environment, and building a reputation would
require conservative policymaking. The post-crisis reemergence of large output shocks has surely
altered that calculus: to the extent that the uncertainty associated with output gap measurement
has become (relatively) less relevant, it has become easier to distinguish opportunistic behavior
from an appropriate response to macroeconomic conditions. This suggests that policymakers can
afford to respond more aggressively to adverse shocks during dire economic circumstances: for
a very large shock (a shift to AS000), as in point C in ﬁgure 5, the central bank can respond opti-
mally to the output shock, without worrying that doing so will undermine the institution’s hard-
earned reputation. The tension in inﬂation targeting between credibility and ﬂexibility should
therefore be less of an issue under these circumstances, especially if the overt exercise of the es-
cape clause or the public explanation of the inﬂation overshoot allows the central bank to com-
municate the extraordinary nature of the shock.
3 Credibility, ﬂexibility, and the behavior of inﬂation forecasts
The goals of this section are twofold. The ﬁrst is to assess the degree to which inﬂation expecta-
tions are anchored in the U.S. and the U.K. The second is to determine whether inﬂation targeting
has created the expectation that the Bank of England will respond aggressively to return inﬂation
to its target within a ﬁxed period of time. Of particular interest is whether the Bank of England
is perceived to behave more conservatively in this regard than the U.S. Federal Reserve, which
operates without an explicit inﬂation target.
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should be especially informative with regard to these two goals. As shown in ﬁgures 6 and 7,
inﬂation in both countries has been noticeably more volatile since 2007 than during the preceding
eight years: 12-month inﬂation exceed the Fed’s presumed implicit CPI objective of 2.5 percent
by over three percentage points in the third quarter of 2008, and dropped below that target by 3.6
percentage points one year later. With the exception of a single quarter, the U.K. has consistently
exceed its 2 percent CPI target since the end of 2007, even as the unemployment rate climbed to
over 7.5 percent. The tension between credibility and ﬂexibility therefore has been particularly
acute in the U.K.
3.1 Are long-run inﬂation expectations well anchored?
Two alternative approaches exist for gauging inﬂation expectations: surveys of professional fore-
casters or households, and ﬁnancial market indicators, such as breakeven inﬂation rates based on
the spreads between nominal and inﬂation-indexed bonds. A clear advantage of market-based
measures over surveys is their high frequency and real-time availability, making it possible (in
theory) to gauge the market’s instantaneous reaction to news. Moreover, in some countries, in-
cluding the U.K., breakeven rates are available for longer horizons (e.g., ten years) than survey
inﬂation expectations data. In addition, there is a presumption that because bond yields are deter-
mined in markets where “real money” is at stake, the implicit forecasts would be more meaning-
ful than those from survey respondents. However a serious problem with the breakeven rates is
their contamination with liquidity and term premia, which Pﬂueger & Viceira (2011) concluded
account for much of the variability in TIPS yields in the U.S. Breakeven inﬂation rates are there-
fore ﬂawed indicators of expected inﬂation.11 While only available at lower frequencies, survey-
based inﬂation forecasts have the clear advantage of being uncontaminated by term and liquidity
premia.
As shown in Figure 8, the 10-year CPI inﬂation forecasts for the U.S. from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters (SPF) have remained remarkably stable at 2.5% since the late 1990s, with a
standard deviation of only 7 basis points.12 Only recently, since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis
11G¨ urkaynak et al. (2010) extracted an estimate of expected inﬂation, but their estimates are conditional on the
questionable assumption that long run expected inﬂation is nonstationary, while the liquidity premium follows an
AR(1).
12This statistic, and those reported subsequently, omit the four quarters from 2008Q3 through 2009Q2 (shaded in the
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to have been an “inﬂation scare.” The ﬁgure also shows that in contrast with the SPF forecasts,
the long-term inﬂation forecasts obtained from the nominal-TIPS spread have been quite volatile,
with standard deviations of 28 and 32 basis points for the 5-year-ahead 5-year forward and 10-
year-ahead breakeven rates. Not surprisingly, the correlation coefﬁcients between these two mea-
sures and the 10-year SPF forecast are low, and indeed have the wrong sign:  0:05 and  0:31
respectively.13
Defects notwithstanding, the long-term breakeven rates have been used in event study analyses
by G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005), G¨ urkaynak et al. (2007), and Beechey et al. (2011) to gauge the
impact of macroeconomic news on long-run inﬂation expectations. The studies report that U.S.
breakeven rates exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant response to economic news, whereas they gener-
ally do not in inﬂation-targeting countries.
The results reported in Table 1 conﬁrm these studies’ ﬁndings for the U.S. Regressions of changes
in various expected inﬂation proxies (the 10-year nominal forward rate, the 10-year breakeven in-
ﬂation rate, and the 5-year forward 5-year breakeven rate) on the surprise component of the core
CPI and payroll employment releases show responses that are highly statistically signiﬁcant. The
coefﬁcients’ magnitudes are quite small in economic terms, however. A one-standard-deviation
core CPI surprise would lead to a 1.6 basis point response in the 10-year forward breakeven in-
ﬂation rate, for example. The maximum in-sample surprise of  0:5 percentage point would have
generated a 8.6 basis point response. The effects of employment surprises are even smaller, with
a one-standard deviation surprise producing a 1.3 basis point response and the maximum in-
sample surprise of 330 thousand leading to a 4.8 basis point change. While these results suggest
that macroeconomic news may have some impact on bond market participants’ long-run inﬂation
expectations, the effect is inconsequential in economic terms. These ﬁndings, along with the lack
of any meaningful ﬂuctuations in the long-run SPF forecasts, suggest that inﬂation expectations
are reasonably well anchored in the U.S.
Table 2 presents an analogous set of results for the U.K., for inﬂation and GDP news (relative
plot), the height of the ﬁnancial crisis.
13In terms of differences, the correlations are  0:18 and  0:12.
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inal forward rate, but even these are quite small in economic terms as the largest inﬂation and
GDP surprises observed in the sample would have generated responses of only three basis points.
The reaction of the 10-year forward breakeven and the 5-year forward 5-year breakeven rates are
negligible in magnitude, and statistically insigniﬁcant.14 The lack of any measurable reaction of
market-based expected inﬂation proxies suggests that, at least on this metric, U.K. inﬂation ex-
pectations are well anchored.
3.2 How fast do inﬂation expectations converge?
The evidence presented above, and elsewhere in the literature, suggests that inﬂation targeting
effectively anchors long-run expectations. We turn now to the question of whether stabilizing ex-
pectations comes at the cost of an excessively inﬂexible commitment to the inﬂation objective.
This is the essence of the Friedman (2004) and Faust & Henderson (2004) concern that a target
framed only in terms of inﬂation could compel the central bank to behave more conservatively
than it would under the optimal state-contingent rule. Alternatively, to the extent that it allows
the central bank to communicate its policies and reassure the public that it is not behaving oppor-
tunistically, an explicit objective may allow an inﬂation targeting central bank to respond more
ﬂexibly to adverse economic shocks than one that was concerned with preserving its reputation.
An informative indicator of a central bank’s ﬂexibility is the speed with which inﬂation is ex-
pected to converge to its target following an economic shock. As shown by Svensson (1997), this
speed of adjustment is directly related to the central bank’s degree of conservatism, represented
by the l in section 2. The idea is that a central bank committed to hitting its target at a speciﬁc
horizon (e.g., two years) would have to increase its speed of adjustment when there was a large
shock. An unconstrained central bank, on the other hand, would choose not to accelerate the ad-
justment process, even if that meant overshooting the target at the two-year horizon.
One way to gauge this speed of convergence would be to estimate a time series model for the
inﬂation rate. In a simple AR(1) model, for example, gradual convergence would be manifested
in a large autoregressive parameter. An approach similar to this has been used in other work, such
14Similar non-responses are obtained with other GDP releases, and with jobless claims data.
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targeting. However this approach is more appropriate for the analysis of long time series, and less
well-suited to shorter samples considered here.
3.2.1 A look at the medium-term inﬂation forecasts
Our approach to assessing ﬂexibility relies instead on medium-term, one- to four-quarter-ahead
inﬂation forecasts. Comparing forecasts at different horizons, it is possible to estimate the speed
with which inﬂation expectations converge to their long-run mean, which should correspond to
the central bank’s inﬂation objective. Our method does not require estimating a time series pro-
cess for inﬂation, and it avoids the complications associated with inference in the presence of a
unit root. Moreover, our concern is less about actual inﬂation, which is apt to be very noisy, and
more about the behavior of inﬂation expectations.
We use the year-over-year (i.e., change over four quarters) inﬂation forecasts provided by Con-
sensus Economics, which collects quarterly forecasts from a panel currently consisting of 27 pro-
fessional economists in the U.S., and 21 in the U.K.15 The forecast horizons extend from one to
six quarters. Forecasts for the two-, four- and six-quarter ahead forecasts are depicted in Figures
9 and 10, along with the 10-year SPF forecast for the U.S., and the ofﬁcial inﬂation target for the
U.K.
In neither the U.S. nor the U.K. are even the six-quarter inﬂation forecasts equal to the long-run
rate (the SPF 10-year forecast for the U.S. or the target for the U.K.). In the U.S., the six-quarter-
ahead forecast fell well below 2.5 percent in 2003-04 and again in the most recent recession. In
the U.K., the medium-term inﬂation forecasts were generally slightly less than the ofﬁcial 2.5
percent pre-2004 RPIX target, and exhibited noticeable ﬂuctuations. After 2004, the medium-
term forecasts deviated quite a bit from the 2 percent target, particularly just prior to the ﬁnancial
crisis as inﬂation rose, and as the economy fell into recession after the crisis. But what is impor-
tant for our empirical method is the fact that the longer-horizon forecasts all tend to be closer to
the long-run tendency than the shorter-term forecasts; our estimates of the speed of convergence
are based on these differences.
15The SPF compiles similar forecast data, but we use the Consensus data for both countries in order to maximize
comparability.
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prisingly, the mean of the forecasts corresponds closely to the widely held belief that the Fed im-
plicitly targets a CPI inﬂation rate of roughly 2.5 percent.16 The key observation is that the stan-
dard deviation, shown in the second row of the table, falls as the forecast horizon increases. In
the U.S., for example, the standard deviation of the one-quarter-ahead forecast is 83 basis points,
falling to 29 basis points at the four-quarter horizon, and 22 basis points at six quarters. The third
line of the table shows the standard deviation in the difference in adjacent forecasts, e.g., between
the three- and four-quarter ahead forecasts made at a given point in time. Here too, the standard
deviation falls with forecast horizon. The standard deviation of the difference between the three-
and four-quarter-ahead forecasts is 25 basis points, compared with 42 basis points for the differ-
ence between the two- and one-quarter ahead forecasts. Somewhat puzzlingly, the standard de-
viation falls by more than half going from the four- to ﬁve-quarter horizon, suggesting that many
forecasters in the Consensus panel may simply be extending their four-quarter-ahead forecasts to
the longer horizons.
Table 3 shows a comparable set of descriptive statistics for the U.K. data, allowing for the mean
to change with the switch from the RPIX to the CPI in 2004. The statistics exhibit the same pat-
terns as in the U.S., the means corresponding closely to the inﬂation target, and the standard de-
viations declining with horizon. Interestingly, the shorter-horizon standard deviations are consid-
erably less than those for the U.S.: 43 basis points, versus 83. The four-quarter-ahead standard
deviations are very similar, however.
3.2.2 A statistical model of expectations convergence
The basis for the model is a decomposition of the current inﬂation rate pt into the sum of “under-
lying” inﬂation ˆ pt and a transitory term vt, which could represent measurement error, temporary
inﬂation shocks, and short-term inﬂation dynamics,
pt = ˆ pt +vt : (4)
16The Fed in recent years has shifted its emphasis towards the PCE deﬂator, whose growth rate since 1999 has aver-
aged 0.32 percentage point less than that of the CPI.
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explicit) inﬂation target p,
Et ˆ pt+1 = f(p  ˆ pt)+ ˆ pt ; (5)
a partial adjustment equation in which f represents the speed of convergence. This can also be
written as
Et(ˆ pt+1 p) = (1 f)(ˆ pt  p) ; (6)
in which 1 f represents the degree of gradualism. This implies that the expected k-step ahead
gap between inﬂation and its long-run rate decays geometrically at rate 1 f,
Et(ˆ pt+k p) = (1 f)k(ˆ pt  p) = (1 f)Et(ˆ pt+k 1 p) : (7)
The expected observed inﬂation includes the expectations of both the underlying inﬂation term,
and the transitory v term. Assuming underlying inﬂation is given by equation (7), this can be
written as
Et(pt+k p) = (1 f)k(ˆ pt  p)+Etvt+k ; (8)
or as
Et(pt+k p) = (1 f)Et(ˆ pt+k 1 p)+Etvt+k : (9)
Interpreting the time t survey-based k-period ahead forecast, p
f
t+kjt as Etpt+k, equation (9) sug-






t+k 1jt +ek;t ; (10)
in which the composite error term includes a conventional error term ek;t, plus the unobserved
expectations of the future transitory inﬂation terms.
ek;t = Etvt+k (1 f)Etvt+k 1+ek;t : (11)
The slope coefﬁcient can be interpreted as the gradualism parameter, 1 f; equivalently, one
minus the slope corresponds to the speed of convergence.17 The implicit inﬂation objective can





as the dependent variable.
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used below are year-over-year inﬂation, but an analogous relationship holds between adjacent
four-quarter forecasts.
The problem with this approach is that the unobserved Etvt+k 1 and Etvt+k terms will be cor-
related with the forecast appearing on the right-hand side of the equation. This is because the
correct speciﬁcation is in terms of underlying inﬂation; using the inﬂation forecast instead intro-
duces an errors-in-variables problem. However if the forecastability of the transitory component
diminishes over time, then using longer-horizon forecasts will mitigate the problem. As an illus-
tration, suppose v followed an MA process so that Etvt+1 = q1vt and Etvt+2 = q2vt. In this case,





t+2jt  (1 f)q2vt +q3vt +e3;t : (12)
In general, both of the transitory inﬂation terms will be correlated with the regressor. If v follows





t+1jt will yield a biased estimate of 1 f in the MA(1) case, however, and the direction
of the bias will depend on the sign of q1
3.2.3 Results
The results from estimating equation (9) on U.S. data from 1999Q2 to 2010Q4 (omitting the four
periods corresponding to the ﬁnancial crisis) for the one- to four-quarter forecast horizons ap-
pear in Table 5.18 With R-squareds in the range of 0.53 to 0.74, the model describes the forecast
data quite well. As expected, the mean inﬂation rate implied by the estimated slope and inter-
cept terms is close to the Fed’s presumed target. The slope coefﬁcients themselves, which can be
interpreted in terms of the perceived degree of gradualism, range between 0.47 and 0.71 depend-
ing on the horizon. Using GLS to estimate the equations for the two-, three- and four-quarter-
ahead forecasts gives an estimate of 0.64, and the cross-equation restrictions are not rejected.
This implies that 36 percent of the gap between underlying inﬂation and the objective is expected
18The longer-horizon ﬁve- and six-quarter forecasts are not used because the changes in adjacent forecasts are small,
on the same order of magnitude as the one signiﬁcant digit precision with which the forecasts are reported. Note
that the right-hand-side variable in the regression involving the one-quarter-ahead forecast is the current quarter’s
forecast (the survey is conducted before all three months of inﬂation data are available).
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vergence parameter would imply that in one year the gap would be reduced to under 0.18 per-
cent.19
The results for the U.K., shown in Table 6 for the 1998Q3 to 2010Q4 sample, are strikingly sim-
ilar to those for the U.S. The equations’ ﬁt is similar, with R-squareds in the 0.7 range. As ex-
pected, the implied objective closely matches the ofﬁcial Bank of England RPIX target pre-2004,
and its CPI target post-2004. More importantly, the slope coefﬁcients are very similar to those for
the U.S., implying a comparable degree of perceived gradualism. The jointly estimated param-
eter of 0.71 says that 29 percent of any inﬂation gap is expected to be eliminated each quarter,
and that a one percent deviation of inﬂation from its target is expected to shrink to a quarter of
a percentage point over four quarters. Over the whole sample, therefore, there is no evidence to
suggest that the Bank of England’s inﬂation target has led it to attack inﬂation any more aggres-
sively than the U.S. Federal Reserve.
The full sample results reported in Tables 5 and 6 may conceal state-dependent differences in the
central banks’ perceived behavior, however. A central bank concerned with maintaining a hawk-
ish reputation may respond more aggressively during high inﬂation periods than it would when
inﬂation was low. Similarly, a bank that felt constrained to hit its target at a ﬁxed horizon might
be unwilling to (optimally) lengthen that horizon when hit with a large adverse shock. Inversely,
as argued above in section 2 , large shocks may allow central banks to act less conservatively to
the extent that the legitimate response to macroeconomic shocks is more easily distinguished
from “cheating.” We investigate these possibilities by estimating the speed of convergence (al-
ternatively, the degree of gradualism) on two pairs of mutually exclusive subsamples: whether
inﬂation is above or below its target, and whether inﬂation is signiﬁcantly either above or below
target.20
Table 7 presents the results for the U.S. What is striking is how little the estimates depend on the
subsample. The estimated degree of gradualism ranges between 0.61 and 0.69 (speeds of con-
vergence between 0.39 and 0.31) regardless of whether the four-quarter inﬂation rate is above or
19Not surprisingly, the estimated speed of convergence is much slower before the late 1990s.
20In the context of the U.S., “target” refers to an assumed 2.5 percent CPI inﬂation objective.
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target.
As in the U.S., the estimates for the U.K., reported in Table 8, also seem largely independent of
the prevailing rate of inﬂation. The degree of gradualism is 0.78 when inﬂation is above target,
and 0.80 when below, a small difference both economically and statistically. The only noticeable
difference in adjustment speeds is in the case of large versus small deviations from the target.21
Here, inﬂation convergence appears to be somewhat more gradual when there are large shocks:
0.80 for large deviations, versus 0.64 for small deviations, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that inﬂation targeting has allowed the Bank of England to respond slightly more ﬂexibly to large
shocks. Given the relatively small number of observations (12), one would not want to push this
conclusion too far. Still, the result shows that the Bank of England’s inﬂation target has not com-
pelled it to behave more like an “inﬂation nutter” when faced with large deviations of inﬂation
from its target.
4 Conclusions
This paper has revisited the ﬂexibility-versus-credibility tension inherent in inﬂation targeting
generally, with the speciﬁc goal of determining whether the monetary policy of the Bank of Eng-
land, which has a formal inﬂation target, has been any less ﬂexible than that of the Federal Re-
serve, which does not have such a target. The empirical analysis brought to bear a novel method
for assessing ﬂexibility: the speed of inﬂation forecast convergence, estimated by comparing pro-
fessional forecasters’ predictions at successively longer horizons.
We found no evidence to suggest that the Bank of England’s inﬂation target compelled it to ﬁght
inﬂation any more aggressively than the Fed. Inﬂation forecasts converge at comparable rates in
both countries. The lack of any detectable asymmetry in either country between the responses
to positive versus negative deviations suggest that overshooting the target has not damaged the
central banks’ credibility; nor has above-target inﬂation elicited a disproportionately aggressive
policy response. Similar results hold when comparing large versus small deviations from the tar-
get. Overall, the Bank of England seems to have been no less ﬂexible than the Fed.
21Given the lower inﬂation volatility in the U.K. vis ` a vis the U.S., a 0:5 threshold was used instead of the 0:75
range for the U.S.
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given that the policy does not seem to lead to less ﬂexibility, at least in the case of the Bank of
England. Numerous studies have shown that in the U.K. inﬂation and its volatility have declined
since the target’s adoption, and expectations have stabilized — but this has happened in most
other countries as well, including the U.S. The unconditional volatility of inﬂation is less than it
is in the U.S., but that could be due to a variety of other reasons. The limited evidence presented
in the paper suggests that inﬂation expectations are better anchored in the U.K. than in the U.S.,
although the quantitative differences are slight. A deﬁnitive answer to this question remains elu-
sive.
Given that IT seems not to have imposed an inﬂexible commitment on the Bank of England, it is
tempting to ask whether IT is too ﬂexible. Perhaps there are gains to be had from moving further
towards the credibility end of the credibility-ﬂexibility spectrum. Price level targeting is one fre-
quently mooted framework that would move in that direction. In many countries, IT has success-
fully stabilized inﬂation expectations, but a credible commitment to a price path would, under
some circumstances, generate stability-enhancing changes in inﬂation expectations.22 The cost of
such a policy in terms of diminished ﬂexibility cannot be dismissed, however. Indeed, the U.K.’s
recent experience is instructive in that regard. Having overshot its inﬂation target for more than
three years, a price level target would perversely, given the current weak state of the British econ-
omy, oblige the Bank of England to keep inﬂation below two percent for an extended period of
time. The issues raised in this paper therefore go beyond the choice of IT versus discretion, and
also apply to the assessment of other proposed alternatives to IT.
22See Svensson (1999b) for a theoretical analysis, and Gaspar et al. (2010) for a simulation-based study.
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Regressor
Dependent variable Core CPI Employment Std dev Min Max
D 10-year nominal forward 12:9 22:0 7:18  19:3 25:0
(6:0) (7:3)
D 10-year forward breakeven 17:2 14:5 4:64  13:2 23:3
(4:0) (4:3)
D 5-year/5-year forward breakeven 10:8 8:8 5:11  13:5 24:1
(4:4) (5:2)
Standard deviation 0:095 0:086
Minimum  0:5  0:33
Maximum 0:4 0:19
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported are from a regression of the change in the indicated inﬂation
expectations proxy, measured in basis points, on the surprise component of either the core CPI
inﬂation rate, measured as a monthly percent change, or the change in payroll employment, mea-
sured in millions. The expected changes in the macro variables are obtained from Money Market
Services. The sample runs from June 1999 through June 2011, excluding the ﬁnancial crisis pe-
riod from September 2008 through June 2009. The CPI surprise regressions include 138 observa-
tions, and the employment surprise regressions include 136.
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Regressor
Dependent variable Inﬂation Advance GDP Std dev Min Max
D 10-year nominal forward 5:2 6:3 4:59  17:0 17:1
(2:3) (3:0)
D 10-year forward breakeven 0:0 1:1 3:02  12:5 18:5
(4:0) (1:6)
D 5-year/5-year forward breakeven  2:5  1:7 5:11  13:4 21:0
(1:5) (1:8)
Standard deviation 0:164 0:24
Minimum  0:5  0:1
Maximum 0:4 0:5
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported are from a regression of the change in the indicated inﬂation
expectations proxy, measured in basis points, on the surprise component of either the inﬂation
rate (RPIX pre-2004, CPI post-2004), measured as a monthly percent change, or the rate of GDP
growth, measured in percentage points. The expected changes in the macro variables are obtained
from Bloomberg. The sample runs from June 1999 through June 2011, excluding the ﬁnancial
crisis period from September 2008 through June 2009. The inﬂation surprise regressions include
135 observations, and the GDP surprise regressions include 45.
Table 3: Medium-term inﬂation forecasts, U.K.
Forecast horizon, quarters
1 2 3 4 5 6
Forecast mean, RPIX period 2:27 2:27 2:17 2:28 2:30 2:32
Forecast mean, CPI period 2:31 2:25 2:12 2:01 1:98 1:95
Forecast standard deviation 0:43 0:36 0:29 0:26 0:23 0:23
Standard deviation of change 0:23 0:21 0:19 0:18 0:16 0:13
Notes: The statistics are for the four-quarter change in the RPIX pre-2004 or the
CPI inﬂation rate post-2004, at the horizon indicated in each column. Data are
from Consensus Economics.
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Forecast horizon, quarters
1 2 3 4 5 6
Forecast mean 2:53 2:43 2:31 2:28 2:20 2:27
Forecast standard deviation 0:83 0:68 0:45 0:29 0:25 0:22
Standard deviation of change 0:58 0:42 0:39 0:25 0:10 0:08
Notes: The statistics are for the four-quarter change in the CPI inﬂation rate, at the
horizon indicated in each column. Data are from Consensus Economics.
Table 5: Estimated expectations convergence model, U.S.
Forecast horizon, quarters (k)
1 2 3 4 2–4
Intercept 0:86 0:62 0:93 1:12 0:75
Implied inﬂation target 2:50 2:13 2:14 2:10 2:08
Slope (1  ˆ f) 0:65 0:71 0:57 0:47 0:64
Standard error (0:07) (0:06) (0:06) (0:07) (0:03)
R-squared 0:70 0:74 0:70 0:53
DW statistic 1:07 2:15 2:09 1:40 1:74
Notes: The sample runs from 1999Q2 through 2010Q4, excluding the ﬁ-
nancial crisis period from 2008Q3 through 2009Q2. The total number of
usable observations is 43. The results reported in the 2–4 quarter horizon
are from the GLS estimation of the equations for the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter
horizons, constraining the coefﬁcients to be equal across equations. The
p-value for the likelihood ratio test of equal coefﬁcients is 0.27.
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Forecast horizon, quarters (k)
1 2 3 4 2–4
Intercept 0:42 0:62 0:67 0:62 0:66
2% target dummy 0:06  0:04  0:14  0:16  0:12
Implied RPI target 2:07 2:27 2:27 2:30 2:28
Implied CPI target 2:34 2:11 1:81 1:72 1:87
Slope (1  ˆ f) 0:80 0:73 0:70 0:73 0:71
Standard error (0:07) (0:06) (0:06) (0:08) (0:04)
R-squared 0:76 0:76 0:76 0:71
DW statistic 1:74 1:64 1:49 1:68 1:64
Notes: The sample runs from 1998Q3 through 2010Q4, excluding the ﬁ-
nancial crisis period from 2008Q3 through 2009Q2. The total number of
usable observations is 46. The results reported in the 2–4 quarter horizon
are from the GLS estimation of the equations for the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter
horizons, constraining the coefﬁcients to be equal across equations. The
p-value for the likelihood ratio test of equal coefﬁcients is 0.60.
Table 7: Estimated degree of gradualism across subsamples, U.S.
Forecast horizon, quarters (k) Obser- LR test
2 3 4 2–4 vations p-value
Above 2.5% 0:53 0:55 0:39 0:61 23 0.21
(0:15) (0:08) (0:11) (0:05)
Below 2.5% 0:67 0:45 0:40 0:63 20 0.35
(0:13) (0:13) (0:14) (0:06)
Outside  0.75% band 0:64 0:56 0:61 0:63 20 0.07
(0:07) (0:06) (0:07) (0:03)
Inside  0.75% band 0:85 0:55 0:38 0:68 23 0.42
(0:13) (0:11) (0:11) (0:05)
Notes: The sample runs from 1999Q2 through 2010Q4, excluding the ﬁnancial
crisis period from 2008Q3 through 2009Q2. The results reported in the 2–4 quar-
ter horizon are from the GLS estimation of the equations for the 2-, 3- and 4-
quarter horizons, constraining the coefﬁcients to be equal across equations. The
p-values for the likelihood ratio test of equal coefﬁcients are reported in the last
column.
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Forecast horizon, quarters (k) Obser- LR test
2 3 4 2–4 vations p-value
Above target 0:78 0:84 0:77 0:78 20 0.25
(0:11) (0:12) (0:10) (0:06)
Below target 0:73 0:63 0:86 0:80 26 0.35
(0:15) (0:08) (0:19) (0:05)
Outside  0.5% band 0:82 0:82 0:72 0:80 12 0.09
(0:09) (0:13) (0:13) (0:06)
Inside  0.5% band 0:70 0:53 0:79 0:64 34 0.12
(0:10) (0:06) (0:15) (0:04)
Notes: The sample runs from 1998Q3 through 2010Q4, excluding the ﬁnancial
crisis period from 2008Q3 through 2009Q2. The results reported in the 2–4 quar-
ter horizon are from the GLS estimation of the equations for the 2-, 3- and 4-
quarter horizons, constraining the coefﬁcients to be equal across equations. The
p-values for the likelihood ratio test of equal coefﬁcients are reported in the last
column.
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Figure 4: Models with private information
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Notes: The SPF data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and the breakeven in-
ﬂation rates from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The shaded area corre-
sponds to the 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 ﬁnancial crisis period.
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Notes: The forecast data come from Consensus Economics. The shaded area corresponds to the
2008Q3 to 2009Q2 ﬁnancial crisis period.
Figure 10: Median Inﬂation Forecasts, U.K.















Notes: The forecast data come from Consensus Economics. The shaded area corresponds to the
2008Q3 to 2009Q2 ﬁnancial crisis period.
!"##$%&
! "#$%&' #("%')*#+( +, *-' ./*/ "011'"*" *-/* *-'2' /2' %'2"#"*'(* .#,,'2'()'" #( 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*'"
/)2+"" )+0(*2#'" '3'( /* "-+2* $/*02#*#'"4 53'2 *-' %/"* 67 8'/2"9 ,+2 ':/$%&'9 / $'/"02' +, *-'
"-+2*;*'2$ 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*' -/" <''( /&$+"* =77 </"#" %+#(*" -#1-'2 #( *-' >(#*'. ?#(1.+$ *-/(
#( *-' >(#*'. @*/*'" .'"%#*' "#$#&/2 ')+(+$#) .'3'&+%$'(*"4 A+2'+3'29 #( / "/$%&' +, /.3/()'.
5BCD )+0(*2#'"9 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*'" ,+2 *-' -#1-'"* E0/2*#&' +, )+0(*2#'" -/3'9 +( /3'2/1'9 <''(
+3'2 =F7 </"#" %+#(*" -#1-'2 *-/( *-+"' ,+2 *-' &+G'"* E0/2*#&' +, )+0(*2#'"4 H-'"' .#,,'2'()'" /2'
.#,I)0&* *+ ':%&/#(J *-' .#"$/(*&#(1 +, </22#'2" *+ #(*'2(/*#+(/& $+3'$'(*" +, )/%#*/& /(. 1++."
G-#)- -/" */K'( %&/)' +3'2 *-' %/"* $'/(" *-/* G' "-+0&. ':%')* /( 'E0/&#"/*#+( +, 2'/& #(*'2'"*
2/*' /)2+"" )+0(*2#'"9 /* &'/"* #( *-' &+(1 20(4 @#()' %'2"#"*'(* #(*'2'"* 2/*' .#,,'2'(*#/&" /2' &#K'&8
*+ /,,')* I2$"L /(. -+0"'-+&."L <+22+G#(1 )+(.#*#+(" /)2+"" )+0(*2#'"9 *-'8 )+0&. /&"+ #$%/)* +(
')+(+$#) /)*#3#*84 >(.'2"*/(.#(1 G-/* )/0"'" *-'"' .#,,'2'()'" #( #(*'2'"* 2/*'" #" *-'2',+2' +,
#(*'2'"*9 /(. #( *-#" %/%'2 G' "'* +0* *+ ':%&+2' *-#" <8 '"*#$/*#(1 /( '$%#2#)/& $+.'& 0"#(1 /
)2+"";)+0(*28 %/('& ./*/ "'*4
M' )+("*20)* "-+2*;*'2$ 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*'" ,+2 / "/$%&' +, NO 5BCD )+0(*2#'" +3'2 *-' %'2#+.
NPOF;677O4 Q/"'. +( *-#" ./*/9 / $'/"02' +, *-' G+2&. #(*'2'"* 2/*' #" )+("*20)*'. 0"#(1 %2#()#%/&
)+$%+('(* /(/&8"#"4 M' '"*/<&#"- *-' ,/)* *-/* #( $/(8 )+0(*2#'"9 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*'" -/3' .'3#/*'.
,2+$ *-' G+2&. #(*'2'"* 2/*' ,+2 &+(1 %'2#+." +, *#$'4 R'2"#"*'(* .'3#/*#+(" "-+0&. <' ':%')*'. #,
*-' %2#)' +, (+(*2/.'. 1++." 2'&/*#3' *+ *2/.'. 1++." $+3' .#,,'2'(*&8 /)2+"" )+0(*2#'"9 /(. *-'
"-/2' +, (+(*2/.'. 1++." #( )+("0$%*#+( ':%'(.#*02' #" &/21'4 M' *28 *+ )+(*2+& ,+2 *-#" <8
)+("*20)*#(1 / $'/"02' +, *-' 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*' $/#(&8 </"'. +( *2/.'/<&'"9 I(.#(1 *-/* *-'
#()&0"#+( +, (+(;*2/.'/<&'" /))+0(* ,+2 "+$' +, *-' .#,,'2'()'" #( 2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*'" /)2+""
)+0(*2#'"9 <0* / &/21' %/2* 2'$/#( 0(':%&/#('.4
M' (':* /210' *-/* *-'"' 0(':%&/#('. #(*'2'"* 2/*' .#,,'2'(*#/&" /2' &#K'&8 *+ 2'S')* 2#"K %2'$#/4 !
"*/(./2. /""'*;%2#)#(1 ,2/$'G+2K #" 0"'. *+ .'2#3' / "*20)*02/& 'E0/*#+( ,+2 *-' ':)-/(1' 2/*' 2#"K
%2'$#0$4 5(' %2'.#)*#+( ,2+$ *-#" $+.'& *-/* -/" (+* %2'3#+0"&8 <''( *'"*'. '$%#2#)/&&8 #" *-/*
2'/& #(*'2'"* 2/*' .#,,'2'(*#/&" /)2+"" )+0(*2#'" "-+0&. <' ('1/*#3'&8 2'&/*'. *+ / $'/"02' +,
2'&/*#3' 3+&/*#&#*8 #( )+("0$%*#+( 12+G*-4 H/K#(1 *-#" -8%+*-'"#" *+ *-' ./*/ #" *-' $/#(
)+(*2#<0*#+( +, *-' %/%'24 502 ,+)0" +( *-' "-+2*'2 '(. +, *-' 8#'&. )023' ,+2 / "/$%&' +,
B:*'2(/& ARC >(#* D#")0""#+( R/%'2 T+4 =7 @'%*'$<'2 67N7 = External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 34 October 2011 33